Allied Scale and the Future of the West
The West can only realise its potential if the US and Europe convert mass into coordinated scale
The Western alliance stands at a critical inflection point. For decades, America and Europe have held unmatched economic, industrial, and military resources, yet these capabilities are increasingly misaligned. Allied scale—the ability to convert collective mass into coordinated, actionable power—was the foundation of Western strength after World War II. It enabled NATO and the European project to transform a continent fractured by war into a US-sponsored platform for sustained leverage. Today, however, that capacity is under strain. Rising global competition, internal dysfunction in Europe, and strategic missteps under Trump threaten to leave the West unable to act cohesively, even as China consolidates its own industrial and technological advantages.
This edition examines the erosion of allied scale and the forces behind it, from the postwar leadership of the “Wise Men” who worked with the EU’s founding father Jean Monnet to translate US resources into durable European capacity, to the financial and strategic predation that now diverts allied capital toward America. It explores the consequences of eurozone structural flaws, the weakening of transatlantic coordination, and the growing misalignment between financial inflows and industrial potential. By integrating history, economics, and strategy, my goal is to show how Europe and the US have gradually undermined the very leverage that once defined their alliance.
Finally, it’s important to look to the future. Despite the challenges, Europe possesses latent industrial capacity and strategic potential that could restore allied scale if mobilised effectively. Defence buildouts, advanced manufacturing, and digital finance offer catalysts for revitalising transatlantic coordination, while selective American engagement could transform Europe’s structural weaknesses into opportunities for partnership.
Allied scale is less a measure of size or resources than a discipline of coordination, investment, and shared, long-term strategic vision. For Europe and America, mastering that discipline once again will determine whether the West can sustain its global influence and collective security in the decades ahead.
1/ Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forces a rethink of our ideas about war and peace
People of my generation, born in the 1970s, grew up believing that military campaigns for territorial gain in Europe would never happen again. Previous conflicts—the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II—had ended in massive destruction and ultimately a territorial status quo. Moreover, post-World War II security arrangements, first established by America and later reinforced during the Cold War, seemed to guarantee that no such reckless ventures would occur again. War still existed, of course, but Europe no longer felt at risk of territorial uncertainty.
Since 2022, however, that certainty has vanished, and one particularly striking development has been the daily expert discussions that refine our understanding of war. Earlier this year, an interview of military historian Phillips O’Brien by Paul Krugman caught my attention. O’Brien emphasises that the outcomes of war depend less on individual tactical victories, such as the battles of Kursk or Stalingrad, and more on the sustained capacity to endure conflict through collective strength. In other words, industrial power and reliable alliances ultimately determine the outcome of war.
Historically, major wars are won by coalitions capable of sustaining long campaigns. O’Brien notes that in both world wars, Germany often had superior armies but lost because it faced stronger coalitions. Its efforts were further hampered by weak partners such as Italy in World War II and Austria-Hungary in World War I. This leads to the enduring conclusion that wars are decided in factories and alliance meetings as much as on battlefields.
This insight directly informs current assessments of global power. The Russia-Ukraine war demonstrates that manufacturing capacity and strong alliances matter more than legacy arsenal size or territorial extent. Ukraine’s access to Western support for ammunition and supply lines allows it to withstand Russia’s aggression. And as long as this alliance holds, Ukraine’s resilience will continue.
2/ Allied scale is one of the key ideas of our time
A helpful way to think about alliances in the post-Cold War world comes from China analyst Rush Doshi, who served on the National Security Council in the Biden administration and wrote the book The Long Game. His work draws on the wider practice of “net assessment”, a long-term review of strengths and gaps that helps planners judge how great-power rivalry may unfold.
To grasp Rush’s idea of “allied scale”, it helps to start with the split between scale and mass:
Mass is the total size, capacity, or resources of a system. It is the plain weight of what exists, whether people, land, or infrastructure. Mao-era China had great mass in its huge population and territory, even though its output and reach stayed low.
Scale is the ability to act well at a certain level or to have an effect that goes beyond the raw mass. It reflects how well a country organises itself and how far it can reach. Countries like Germany or Japan show scale without mass. They have modest populations and land, yet they achieve strong economic results through high output, new ideas, and global trade.
In short: mass is size and scale is leverage.
Now, it is not enough for several nations to join and call themselves allies for them to gain allied scale. To gain scale, they must work out their aims, their plans, and the part each state plays. Rush’s view is that this, allied scale, is America’s strongest edge over China. When taken together, the US and its allies hold roughly THREE TIMES China’s nominal GDP and about twice its GDP adjusted for purchasing power. No single state in the world, even China, can match the West’s mass or the scale that comes from it when it is well used.
Conversely, Rush warns that a leading power can lose its lead if it fails to turn mass into scale. In particular, Europe, in his view, must face its habit of having relative mass but not turning that mass into scale and then into power. How well the West works through these issues will decide how much leverage it has in world affairs, whether in war, industry, or any other field.
3/ Allied scale after World War II was built through NATO and the European project
In a masterful Twitter thread published in 2018, journalist and author Claire Berlinski explained how allied scale was achieved by the US in the Cold War era. Her insight is that the US did not merely create NATO to deter Soviet aggression; it also built a broader framework that made Europe manageable and stable. NATO provided a security umbrella, but it was the European project—the construction européenne, as the French call it—that turned European size into usable scale. By encouraging cooperation, trade, and shared institutions, the Americans ensured that Europe could never again fall into the destructive rivalries that had defined its past.
A central figure in this effort was Frenchman Jean Monnet. Monnet was not a career politician or a conventional statesman; he was a practical organiser, a builder of institutions, and a firm Atlanticist. His early years selling his family’s cognac in America had shaped his worldview: he understood American resources, culture, and organisational capacity, and he believed Europe’s security and prosperity depended on a close partnership with the US. During and after the war, Monnet cultivated close relationships with influential Americans, including the legendary W. Averell Harriman and other “Wise Men” of US policy circles. Through these connections, he was able to translate US strategic interests into European institutions.
Monnet’s approach perfectly reflected Rush’s logic of allied scale. He did not aim simply to gather European states under a common banner; he sought to make them act collectively, to turn fragmented national power into coordinated, effective action.
The European Coal and Steel Community, the precursor to today’s European Union (and Monnet’s brainchild), exemplified this principle: by pooling resources critical to both industry and security, from 1954 onward Monnet and his collaborators created leverage that exceeded any single nation’s capacity. This, Claire notes, was a conscious American goal as much as a European initiative: by shaping institutions, the US converted European mass into scale, making the continent secure, prosperous, and politically predictable.
In short, allied scale after World War II was a dual project. NATO guaranteed defence and deterred aggression, while the European project enabled coordination, economic integration, and political stability. Together, they allowed Europe to become a dependable partner in a larger alliance system, one in which the US bore the burden of security while Europe delivered scale. Monnet’s vision, supported by American power, was the practical embodiment of this strategy.
4/ The Western alliance weakened from the 1970s onward
By the 1970s, the Western alliance that had been built with such care after World War II began to fray. Several converging forces undermined the structures that had converted European mass into effective scale: